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McDonald: Age Discrimination in Employment Suits: A Practical Guide

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
SUITS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
Age discrimination occurs in numerous forms but is rarely

overt and unconcealed. The elderly often suffer discrimination in
employment without the appearance of blatant violations on the
part of the employer. For the most part, the aggrieved party must
look to the total surrounding circumstances in order to determine
if sodie form of discrimination has taken place. It is therefore important that the attorney become sensitive to the intricacies of the
law of age discrimination in employment in order to protect the
rights of his clients.
This Note is written in the hope of providing the attorney
with the practical information-that may be of use in the preparation of an age discrimination suit. In surveying recent federal decisions in the area of age discrimination, this article will focus upon
those elements of an age discrimination suit which have traditionally presented the most difficulty for attorneys. West Virginia
law, where available and relevant, will also be explored.
I. DETERMMG IF AGE DISCRIMINATION ExIsTs
One of the most important tasks for the attorney is to aid his
client in the initial determination of whether the potential for an
age discrimination claim exists. To aid in this initial determination, it is helpful to have prepared a series of questions to ask the
elderly client. The basis of these questions is: given the person's
work record and qualifications, would he have been treated differently if he were younger? A detailed questionnaire designed to
elicit further indications of age discrimination has been provided
by the Northwestern Illinois Area Agency on Aging.' The following
questions from that publication are recommended for use in the
initial stages of an age discrimination investigation.
For use in representing a dismissed employee:
(1) Does the employer have a young work force? Are older
workers encouraged to stay long enough to become eligible for
NORTHWESTERN ILLINOIS AREA AGENcY ON AGING, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, reprintedfrom B. DUDLEY, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: A MAN-

UAL FOR THE OLDER WORKER (1977). See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, INTERPRETATIVE BULLSrIN, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT Acr OF 1967, furnished upon

request from U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Washington, D.
C. 20210; 29 C.F.R. § 860 (1978).
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pension benefits or, rather, urged to take early retirement?
(2) Was the employee replaced by a person who was younger,
less qualified, or needed training to carry out the job?
(3) Was the employee transferred or promoted to a position
where he could no longer meet job requirements? Was he passed
over for a promotion or a training program for which he was
eligible?
(4) Did the employee suddenly begin receiving bad evaluations or warnings or citations for imaginary or generally overlooked mistakes?
For use in representing a job applicant:
(1) Did the employer state specific qualifications or include a
job description? 2
(2) Did the employer state why the applicant was not hired?
If the hiring was based on a point system or oral interview, did
the employer explain in what areas the applicant was deficient?
If the hiring was based on a test, did it test only those skills
which are actually needed on the job?
(3) Was the applicant told he or she was overqualified for the
job or might not fit in with the younger work force?
(4) If the applicant was asked to state his age was there a
statement or notice that age would not be a basis of
3
discrimination?
(5) Did a younger, less qualified applicant get the job?'
II.

COVERAGE OF THE ADEA AND THE WEST VIRGINIA HUMAN RIGHTS

AcT
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act is designed to
"promote employment of older persons based on their ability
rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment."" The
ADEA thus establishes the aged as a specifically protected class
of persons. Protection was originally given only to those employees
and labor union members aged 40 through 64.6 In 1978, however,
Congress extended protection to include all employees and labor
2 If the necessary qualifications for the job are vague, the vagueness may be
purposeful, allowing the employer or employment agency to discriminate.
3 Federal law requires that notice of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act be posted in all personnel or hiring offices. 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1976).
4 NORTHWESTERN ILLINOIS AREA AGENCY ON AGING, supra note 1, at 1-2.
5 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976).
1 Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 12, 18 Stat. 607 (1967).
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union members aged 40 through 69.1 The ADEA acts as a shelter
against discrimination by three main groups: employment agencies, 8 labor organizations,9 and employers with 20 or more employ10
ees.
The activities which are prohibited by the ADEA vary according to the respective group which is being regulated. The primary
restriction placed upon employment agencies prohibits their refusal, based solely upon the age of the applicant, to refer an elderly
employee to a job opening." Labor organizations are prohibited
from discriminating against older workers in membership, classification, or referral for employment, and from causing an employer
to discriminate against his employees."2 Finally, an employer may
not discriminate based upon age in the hiring or discharge of a
covered employee, or with respect to the covered employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

3

It is

I Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-256, § 12(c)(2), 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 63i (1970)). This
section of the 1978 Amendments also effectively bars mandatory retirement for all
employees other than federal employees. The Senate Report concerning the 1978
Amendments provided several reasons for abolishing mandatory retirement:
(1) [Als a matter of basic civil rights people should be treated in employment on the basis of their individual ability to perform a job rather
than on the basis of stereotypes about race, sex, or age.
(2) In fact, the evidence clearly establishes the continued productivity
of workers who are 65 years of age and older.
(3) Mandatory retirement works severe injustices against the aged. For
many, retirement income from public and private sources is unavailable
or inadequate to support a comfortable existence.
(4) Substantial evidence exists that mandatory retirement may have a
severe deteriorative impact on the physical and psychological health of
older individuals.
(5) Society as a whole suffers from mandatory retirement ....
[Miandatory retirement costs the nation three-tenths of one percent of
its annual gross national product."
S. REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 3, 4, reprintedin [1978] U. S. CODE CONG.
& AD.NEws 1978-79.
29 U.S.C. § 630(c) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 860.36 (b), (c) (1978).
29 U.S.C. § 630(d) (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976), (amending 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1970)). Also included as an employer under this section is (1) any agent of such employer, and
(2) a state or political subdivision of a state, and any interstate agency; but the term
employer does not include the United States government or any corporation wholly
owned by the United States government.
29 U.S.C. § 623(b) (1976).
,229 U.S.C. § 623(c) (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976). "Compensation" includes all types and methods
of remuneration paid to or on behalf of or received by an employee for his employ-
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important to recognize that these restrictions bar all discrimination against anyone within the protected class. Thus an employer
may not show preference to one individual within the age group at
the expense of discrimination against another within the group; 4
that is, an employer could not promote a 42 year old employee
instead of a 50 year old employee solely on the basis of age. This
proscription, however, does not prevent an employer from setting
up benefit plans for older workers which will subsequently apply
to younger workers once they reach a certain age.
In 1967, the same year the ADEA was enacted, West Virginia
enacted the West Virginia Human Rights Act,'" bringing West
Virginia essentially in accord with federal guidelines. West Virginia employers, 6 labor organizations, 7 and employment agencies 8 are now prohibited under state law from engaging in agebased discriminatory practices. Employment agencies are prohibited from discriminating in referral for employment," and employers and labor organizations are prohibited from discrimination
with respect to compensation, hire, tenure and conditions of employment."
Although conforming to the ADEA in most respects, the West
Virginia Human Rights Act falls short of its federal counterpart in
one important area: the age of the protected class. The Human
Rights Act continues to give protection to a smaller number of our
state's elderly, covering only those ages 40 through 65.21 With the
recent extension of federal protection under the 1978 Amendments
ment. 29 C.F.R. § 860.50(b) (1978). "Terms, conditions, or privileges" includes but
is not limited to job security, advancement, status, and benefits. 29 C.F.R. § 860.50
(c) (1978).

Other restrictions on the employer include:
(1)

29 U.S.C. § 623(d): prohibiting retaliation against an older worker

for asserting his rights under the ADEA.
(2) 29 U.S.C. § 623(e): prohibiting advertisements or notices which indicate any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based

on age. See also, 29 C.F.R. § 860.92 (1978).
" 29 C.F.R. § 860.91 (1978).

W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1 -19 (Cum. Supp. 1978). A statement of the Act's
purpose is found in W. VA. CODE § 5-11-2 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
,W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(d) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
Id. at § 3(f).
Id. at § 3(g).
" Id. at § 9(e).
Id. at § 9(a), (c).
' Id. at § 3(q).
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to the ADEA, it seems appropriate that the West Virginia Legislature similarly extend the coverage of the West Virginia Act.?
III.

BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE PRIMA FACE CASE

While there has been some speculation as to whether the standard allocation of burdens used in civil suits would be applied to
age discrimination cases, case law, primarily originating from the
Fifth Circuit, suggests that such use is appropriate. In 1972, the
Fifth Circuit in Hodgson v. First Federal Savings & Loan
Association indicated that the initial burden is on the plaintiff to
produce enough evidence to establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination, and upon such a showing the court would then look
to the defendant for an explanation.? In 1975, in Bittarv. Canada,
the same court reiterated that once the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case the burden shifts to the defendant to produce
evidence sufficient to rebut the plaintiff's claims.24 This allocation
of burdens conforms with the standards ordinarily applied in civil
actions.?
The requirements of a prima facie showing of age discrimination vary among the federal courts. 6 Thus, the discussion to follow
will not attempt to define a standard prima facie case. Rather it
will review the recent developments of judicial thought in order to
provide a workable formulation which should be helpful in establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination.
Because of the similarity between the ADEA and Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act,2" federal courts originally looked for
For a discussion of the relationship between state coverage and federal coverage, see text accompanying notes 68-80, infra.
- 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
24 512 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1975); Price v. Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.
1977).
2 See Note, The Age Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 380 (1976); 9 J. WIGMORE, EvID CE § 2489 (3rd ed. 1940); F. CLEcKLEY, HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE FOR WEST VmINIA LAwYERs § 73 at 498 (1978). But see, C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE §§ 337-38 at 14-15 (2d ed. 1972);
McNaughton, The Burden of Production A Function of Persuasion,68 HAiv. L.
REV. 1382 (1955).
24 One method of establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination is by
the use of statistics. For an excellent treatment of this method see Schultz v.
Hickok Manufacturing Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Note, Beyond the
Prima Facie Case in Employment DiscriminationLaw: Statistical Proof and
Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1975); Montack, Using Statistical Evidence to
Enforce Laws Against Discrimination,22 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 259 (1973).
S"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer. . . to fail or
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guidance to previous cases brought under Title VII in order to
construct by analogy the prima facie elements in an age discrimination suit. In the Title VII decision of McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, the United States Supreme Court held that in order for
a Title VII plaintiff to establish a prima facie case he must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority;
(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and
the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of the
complainant's qualifications.Y
In 1977, however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided
two cases which serve to confuse a prospective ADEA plaintiff in
his determination of whether he must meet the requirements set
forth in McDonnell. In Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., the Fifth
Circuit adopted the McDonnell test, thus holding an ADEA plaintiff to the same standards as a Title VII plaintiff. 2 In Marshall v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., however, the Fifth Circuit indicated
that there need not be a "stagnant adoption" by the courts in
ADEA suits of the parallel guidelines established in McDonnell,
but rather that the court is free, based upon language from
McDonnell itself, to change the requirements as factual situations
require20 Thus the appropriate and more stringent test to be applied following Goodyear Tire becomes: (1) the plaintiff must
prove that he is within the protected group; (2) the plaintiff must
prove that he was not hired or that he was discharged; and (3) the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant sought to and did replace
the plaintiff with a younger person.'
refuse to hire or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individuals race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970). "It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants
for employment ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter." Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a) (1970).
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972).
561 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir. 1977).
:'554 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1977). "[Tjhe facts will necessarily vary.
.and
the specifics of the prima facie proof required ... is not necessarily applicable in
every respect to differing factual situations." Id. at 735, quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1972).
31554 F.2d at 735-36.
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To add to these confusing standards, in 1977 the Northern
District of California, in Marshall v. Hills Bros., made a total
break from the Title VII line of cases and stated that "age discrimination is sufficiently different from race and sex discrimination
that the lenient requirements for establishing a prima facie case
under Title VII may not be applicable to suits under the Age Discrimination Act."3 In Marshall,the court found that the plaintiffs
had not established a prima facie case of age discrimination despite their having shown that: (1) eleven employees had been fired,
nine of whom were in the protected class; (2) of the nine in the
protected class, eight were replaced with younger workers; (3)
when given a choice, the defendant fired the older worker; and (4)
the defendant had on numerous occasions mentioned its firing of
older workers. Noting the intent of Congress to have ADEA actions
interpreted on a case by case basis, 33 the court found that the
defendant was in a grave financial crisis and had used a permissi34
ble method of determining which employees would be dismissed.
This deviation from prior judicial thinking is of major significance to the prospective ADEA plaintiff. If the courts continue the
pattern begun in Goodyear Tire and Hills Bros., ADEA plaintiffs
will be faced with two hurdles: (1) compliance with strict guidelines requiring the plaintiff to show that he was in fact replaced
by a younger person, and (2) the possibility that despite the clarity
of the discrimination, the court will nevertheless view the employer's actions as justified based upon the totality of the circumstances and the supposedly equitable methods available to the
employer to determine which employees will be discharged.

IV. BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
Not all actions by an employer which may appear, to be discriminatory are prohibited by the ADEA. The most frequently
used exception to the ADEA is the "bona fide occupational qualification" defense.- Any action by an employer which may otherwise
432 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
Id., citing H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in
119671 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2213, 2220.
31 Id.
3 For further exceptions see 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1), (3) (1970) (discharge and
discipline for good cause); 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1970) (bona fide benefit plans);
Malciauskas, Age Discriminationin Employment: The Scope of Statutory Exceptions to the Age Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 864
(1977); United Airlines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
'
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be prohibited by the ADEA is not considered unlawful where age
is "a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of the particular business." 3 As would be
expected, the BFOQ defense has been the subject of numerous
interpretations. Nevertheless a definite pattern of interpretation
has evolved, one which, if viewed in its historical context, will
allow a fairly conclusive determination of the requirements of proof
employers must meet in order to establish the BFOQ defense.
In an attempt to define the elements needed to establish a
BFOQ defense, the courts once again looked for guidance to previous Title VII actions. Thus two important and totally divergent
Title VII actions-sex discrimination cases-became the basis for
interpreting the BFOQ defense: Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone
& Telegraph Co. 7 and Diaz v. PanAmerican World Airlines, Inc. 11
Weeks held that in order to maintain a BFOQ defense an employer
"has the burden of proving that he had reasonable cause to believe,
that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all
women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties
of the job involved."39 In taking a more stringent view of the BFOQ
defense, the court in Diaz stated: "we apply a business necessity
test, not a business convenience test. That is to say, discrimination
based on sex is valid only when the essence of the business operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively."4 Thus, under Diaz, for an employer to qualify for use of
the BFOQ defense, the basis of the job discrimination must be
related to the purpose of the business involved. This requirement
is best seen in the Diaz holding that the employer's refusal to hire
male cabin attendants was invalid because such discrimination
was not related to the employer's primary business function - safe
transportation.
The first attempt by the courts to interpret the BFOQ defense
in an age discrimination suit came in 1974 in the decision of
Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines.4 Upholding an intercity bus prac- 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970). W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
- 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
11408 F.2d at 235. The court held that an employer's refusal to hire women for
a job that required occasional strenuous activity violated the Title VII prohibition
against employment discrimination.
442 F.2d at 388.
" 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). For further
discussion of this case see Employment Discrimination- Age Discriminationin
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tice of refusing applications for drivers from individuals thirty-five

years of age or older, the court in Hodgson chose to adopt the Diaz
test and held that an employer need only demonstrate a "minimal
increase in risk of harm for it is enough to show that elimination
of the hiring policy might jeopardize the life of one more person
than might otherwise occur under the present hiring practice."42
Thus the court in an employer-oriented decision chose to give a
broad interpretation to the BFOQ exception.
In 1976 an entirely different approach was taken by the Fifth
Circuit. In Usery v. Tamiami TrailLines 3 the court indicated that
the Seventh Circuit in Hodgson had misinterpreted both Weeks
and Diaz. The court felt that rather than being forced to choose
between the two available tests that the two tests should be used
in conjunction; with a satisfaction of the Diaz test being a condition precedent to the application of the Weeks test. Thus a twopronged test evolved for use in determining whether the BFOQ
defense has been satisfied:
(1) Apply Diaz: determine if the justification for the discrimination relates to the business purpose. Employers cannot discriminate for reasons unrelated to the essence of the employer's

business.
(2) Apply Weeks: determine if there is any reasonable factual

basis to indicate that the excluded class of persons cannot do
the job involved. An employer must show that such a factual

basis does exist.
The most recent pronouncement by the federal courts relating
to the BFOQ defense comes from the Fourth Circuit in the 1977
case of Arritt v. Grisell.4 The plaintiff had applied for employment
as a police officer in Moundsville, West Virginia. The plaintiff's
application was denied on the grounds that he was forty years old
and thus ineligible to take the required physical and mental exams
in accordance with West Virginia law limiting original applicants
to ages between eighteen and thirty-five. The plaintiff sought
relief under the ADEA and the defendant raised the BFOQ defense. In ordering the case remanded, 6 the court took an extensive
Employment Act of 1967 - BFOQ - Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, 16 B.C. IND. &
Com. L. R. 688 (1975).
"

499 F.2d at 863.

13531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
" 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977).
'

W. VA. CODE § 8-14-12 (1976 Replacement Vol.).

, Remand was based upon the lower court's refusal to allow the plaintiff to
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look at the decisions in Hodgson and Tamiami Trail. After careful
consideration, the Fourth Circuit adopted the two-pronged test
promulgated in Tamiami Trail.
The majority of courts now appear to be more inclined to
apply the two-pronged test combining Weeks and Diaz in determining whether the employer has established a BFOQ defense.
Therefore, in any attempt to rely upon a BFOQ defense it can be
stated with some certainty that an employer will be required to
show two things: (1) that the discriminatory job description is
related to the purpose of his business, and (2) that a factual basis
exists which indicates that the class of people excluded from that
job cannot handle the duties required.
V.

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE

A.

ADEA

The Form of Notice

Perhaps the most confusing and misunderstood aspect of the
ADEA is the procedure that ADEA plaintiffs must follow in order
to bring a claim in federal court, for it is a rare instance where the
federal courts have been in agreement regarding the interpretation
to be given to the ADEA's procedural requirements. The ADEA
requires that prior to the commencement of any civil action an
individual must give the Secretary of Labor not less than sixty
days notice of an intent to sue."7 Here, as with other sections of the
ADEA, the federal courts have split in their interpretations of the
rebut the case established by the defendant during his attempt to prove a BFOQ
defense.
1129 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976). In addition to dispute over the form of notice that
is required, another issue raised by § 626(d) is whether the ADEA plaintiff must
actually wait sixty days after he has filed his notice of intent to sue prior to instituting a civil action. Surprisingly enough, the federal courts have been in virtual
agreement that this sixty-day waiting period is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a
private suit under the ADEA. See Hatfield v. Mitre Corp., 562 F.2d 84 (Ist Cir.
1977); Rucker v. Great Scott Supermarkets, 528 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1976). Even
though the plaintiff files his civil action prior to the expiration of the sixty-day
period, therefore resulting in dismissal, the plaintiff may still wait until the filing
date matures and re-file his action. See Mizuguchi v. Molokai Electric Co., 411 F.
Supp. 590 (D. Haw. 1976). It is important to realize that the sixty-day waiting
period is also applicable to actions brought under § 633(b), where the alleged
unlawful practice occurs in a state which has an age discrimination law and an
agency to enforce that law.
As a practical matter, to save time and to assure that notice requirements are
met, an attorney should file on the same day both his complaint with the relevant
state agency (if required to file in the state first) and his notice of intent to sue with
the Secretary of Labor.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol81/iss3/10

10

McDonald: Age Discrimination in Employment Suits: A Practical Guide

AGE DISCRIMINATION SUITS

type of notice that is required. Authority exists for finding that the
notice could be in any one of the following forms: (1) written notice
of the grievance, with an express statement of intent to sue; 4 (2)
written notice of the grievance, with no express statement of intent
to sue;4" (3) oral notice of the grievance, with an express statement
of intent to sue;50 and (4) oral notice of the grievance, without an
express statement of intent to sue.'
The arguments in favor of requiring either written notice or a
statement of express intent to sue are predicated on the theory that
both forms will allow the Secretary of Labor to better perform his
conciliation duties as required by the ADEA. 5 2 It is believed that
the necessary inforany other form of notice is incomplete, lacking
3
mation to justify action by the secretary.
The most convincing argument in favor of the allowance of
oral notice lies in the ambiguity of the statutory section itself, for
nowhere within the ADEA is written notice specifically required.5Y
The 1976 decision of Smith v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. provides
justification for the assertion that grievance, either written or oral,
filed with the Secretary of Labor should suffice as adequate notice. 5 The nature of the ADEA suggests that no statement of express intent to sue is required. The ADEA, as Smith indicates, is
remedial and humanitarian legislation and thus should be liberally
construed to achieve its purpose of protecting older workers from
discrimination. Additionally, Smith reminds us that in a majority
of the ADEA cases the complaints will be filed by nonlawyers and
therefore it would be inequitable to hold them to such stringent,
inflexible rules.
B.

The 180-Day Period:A "Jurisdictional"or "Procedural"
Requirement?

Where an action is brought pursuant to § 626(d) (1) (where the
plaintiff's claim arises in a state not having an age discrimination
act), the sixty-day notice of intent to sue must be filed within 180
See Burgett v. Cudahy, 361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973).
See Smith v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 419 F. Supp. 770 (D.N.J. 1976).
See Sutherland v. SFK Industries, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
' See, Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973).

"
"

52

29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).

53Burgett v. Cudahy, 361 F. Supp. 617, 621 (D. Kan. 1973).
-' See Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911, 915 (N.D. Ga. 1976);
29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976).
1 419 F. Supp. 770 (D.N.J. 1976).
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days after the alleged discriminatory practice occurs." If the action
is brought pursuant to § 633(b) (where the plaintiff's claim arises
in a state which has an age discrimination law and an agency
charged with enforcement of that law) the time limit is extended
to 300 days after the alleged discriminatory practice or to thirty
days after receipt by the individual of notice that proceedings
7
under state law have been terminated, whichever is earlier.
Once again a review of case law reveals disagreement among
the federal courts in their interpretations. The disagreement is
centered upon the degree of importance to be given the 180-day
requirement. One position is that the 180-day period is a
"jurisdictional" prerequisite to any federal civil action under the
ADEA and therefore, when not complied with, the federal courts
are without jurisdiction to hear the case. The opposing view is that
no such jurisdictional prerequisite exists, but rather that the 180day period is a "procedural" requirement. This second theory provides for the tolling or extension of the 180-day period for equitable
reasons. Thus, where reasonable justification exists as to why the
notice of intent to sue was not filed within 180 days of the alleged
discriminatory practice, the action is not barred.5"
The first judicial determination of § 626(d) as a jurisdictional
prerequisite occurred in 1974 with the Fifth Circuit decision in
56Two totally divergent views have been offered by the courts for determining

exactly when the discriminatory practice took place so as to know when the 180day period begins to run. The first approach, that taken by the Fifth Circuit,
embddies a pro-employer attitude. The Fifth Circuit has held that the discriminatory practice has occurred for the purposes of beginning the 180-day period when
the employer, by acts or words, shows a clear intention to dispense with the services
of an employee or, at the latest, as of the date after which the employee's services
are no longer accepted. Payne v. Crane Co., 560 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1977). The
Eighth Circuit has adopted a more lenient attitude, stating that the 180-day period
begins at the time the employee is terminated for administrative purposes (i.e.,
taken off the payroll, disability insurance is ended, etc.), rather than when the
employee is told that he no longer has a job. Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525
F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975). For a discussion of both the Fifth and Eighth Circuits' views
and an innovative method whereby the plaintiff may extend the 180-day period,
see Thomas v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours and Co., 574 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1978).
29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (1976).

Note that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(b) 92 Stat. 189 (1978) amended 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) by
changing the term "notice" to "charge." Also it is important to note here that the
legislative history of the 1978 Amendments clearly specifies that the 180-day requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit in federal court. Conf. Report,
H. R. REP. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1006.
"
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Powell v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co."9 Rejecting the plaintiffs argument that § 626(d) should be treated in similar fashion
to a statute of limitations and thus be subject to equitable tolling,
the Fifth Circuit adopted the narrow view that any failure to file
the specified time limits would
the notice of intent to sue within
60
be fatal to an ADEA claim.
In Edwards v. KaiserAluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc., however, the Fifth Circuit indicated that reasons may exist which
would allow postponing the beginning of the 180-day period.',
While technically following Powell in holding § 626(d) to be a
jurisdictional prerequisite, Edwards did leave the door open. The
court suggests that the 180-day period would not begin until the
ADEA plaintiff has been discharged and he either6 2retains counsel
or acquires actual knowledge of his ADEA rights.
Other jurisdictions, specifically the Tenth and Third Circuits,
share the view that the 180-day requirement is only a procedural
provision. The Tenth Circuit confronted this issue in the 1976 case
of Dartt v. Shell Oil Co. and held that no absolute bar to an ADEA
action exists where the plaintiff fails to file his notice of intent to
sue within 180 days.63 As justification for allowing equitable modifications of the 180-day period, the court cited the following: (1)
the ADEA provision is similar to the Title VII provision interpreted by the Fifth Circuit to allow equitable tolling; (2) the Fifth
Circuit in Edwards indicated that equitable tolling may apply to
the 180 period; (3) the ADEA is remedial in nature and should be
liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff; and (4) justice and
equity require that the lack of legal training of most ADEA plaintiffs be given some consideration." Is should be remembered, however, that the court's use of this equitable power is limited to
circumstances where the tolling allowance will serve the purposes
'
"

494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974).

The Fifth Circuit reiterated its hardline approach to § 626(d) when it held

that sickness and hospitalization of the plaintiff was not sufficient to toll the 180day period. Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
" 515 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Adams v. Federal Signal Corp., 559
F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1977).
62.This method of tolling the time period differs from the cases to be discussed
which hold § 626(d) to be only a procedural requirement. In Edwards, the method
used to extend the time period focuses on the time prior to the beginning of the
180.day period. Edwards does not allow for a tolling of the 180-day peridd based
upon events which might occur after the 180-day period begins.
' 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976).
64 Id. at 1260.
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of the notice requirement, that is, where tolling will allow the
Secretary sufficient opportunity to conciliate the dispute and will
assure the employer adequate notice. 5
The Third Circuit chose the more liberal view in Bonham v.
Dresser Industries, Inc.6" After reviewing both Powell and Dartt,
the Third Circuit found Dartt to be the sounder rule and held that
the 180-day period merely existed in the nature of a statute of
limitations and could therefore be tolled for equitable reasons."
C.

§ 633: Federal/State Relationship

In passing the ADEA, Congress did not intend to strip the
states of their power to act in the area of age discrimination in
employment.68 Yet despite the agreement that states are to retain
power to adjudicate age discrimination claims, an intensely debated issue has arisen over whether the ADEA requires an aggrieved individual to seek redress from a state agency before he
may properly institute a federal action. This debate is the product
of § 633(b) which states:
In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State
which has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority
to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice, no suit
may be brought under Section 626 of this title before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced
under the State law.
Initial federal court decisions held that § 633(b) requires an
individual to resort to the available state remedies prior to filing
federal suit. The principal justification is drawn from the similarity between § 633(b) of the ADEA and § 2000e-5(b) of the 1964
Civil Rights Act." Since § 2000e-5(b) has been construed to require
Id. at 1261.

"

569 F.2d 187 (3rd Cir. 1977) (appeal pending).
See generally, Note, ProceduralPrerequisitesto Private Suit Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 457 (1977). The Fourth
Circuit has not addressed this issue. See Noto v. JFD Electronics Corp., 446 F.
Supp. 92 (E.D.N.C. 1978). However, the Fourth Circuit has held the similar Title
VII provision to be strictly jurisdictional. See McFadden v. Baltimore S. S. Trade
Ass'n, 352 F. Supp. 403 (D. Md. 1973), affl'd, 483 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1973); Mickel
v. South Carolina State Employment Service, 377 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1967).
18See 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1975); S.REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 976.
1' In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring
8

in a State ... which has a ... law prohibiting the unlawful employ-
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an attempt of state resolution prior to seeking federal relief, numerous courts have held that § 633(b) also requires such an interpretation." This "state relief first" theory has been carried to such
extremes that in one instance the Third Circuit held that where
the state filing requirement is less than the 180-day ADEA requirement, the aggrieved individual is still required to file a futile state
complaint within the 180-day period even though the state time
period has elapsed. 7
During the period when most of the federal circuit courts were
holding steadfastly to the "state relief first" rule, a few of the
federal district courts were laying the ground for the presently
prevailing attitude among the circuits. Vazquez v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. first represented the view that Congress did not intend
to place the same delay producing restrictions upon the ADEA
that it had placed upon Title VII actions. 2 Only where the plaintiff
chooses to seek redress in the state first would section 633(b) require that the state be given sixty days to conciliate the grievance.
In Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc. an even more persuasive argument was presented. In Bertrand the court reasoned
that, when considering section 626 as the jurisdictional section and
section 633 as the federal/state relationship section, it would not
make sense for Congress to have required state relief first when
section 633(a) states that 3once the federal suit is instituted it supercedes any state action.
Finally, in 1978 the Sixth and Third Circuits officially accepted the reasoning offered by the lower courts in Vasquez and
Bertrand and held that section 633(b) does not require an aggrieved party to seek state relief first.74 The most complete discussion for not requiring state relief first is found in the Third Circuit
aument practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State ...
no charge may be
thority to grant or seek relief from such practice ...

filed ...

by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after

proceedings have been commenced under State ...

law.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
70See Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3rd Cir. 1977); Rogers
v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1977) cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Goger v. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13 (3rd Cir. 1973).
7, Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3rd Cir. 1977).
72 405 F. Supp. 1353 (D.P.R. 1975).
419 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (N.D. I1. 1976).
7' Holliday v. Ketchum, McLeod, & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d 1221 (3rd Cir. 1978);
Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp., 573 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1978).
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decision in Holliday v. Ketchum, McLeod & Grove, Inc." Dispelling the Goger analogy between the ADEA and Title VII, Holliday
related that not only have numerous scholars rejected such comparisons" but that the United States Supreme Court early in 1978
had laid the issue to rest in Lorillard v. Pons." Holding that a
plaintiff has a right to a jury trial in ADEA suits, the Court specifically rejected the relevance of Title VII procedures to lawsuits
which allege age discrimination: "[R]ather than adopting the
procedures of Title VII for ADEA actions, Congress rejected that
course in favor of incorporating the Fair Labor Standards Act procedures even while adopting Title VII substantive prohibitions.""6
Thus since the FLSA does not require any resort to state proceedings in order to gain redress for FLSA violations, no such requirements should exist in ADEA actions.
The court in Holliday offered several other compelling justifications for its rejection of the requirement of state relief first. Noting the absence of any requirement on the face of the ADEA, the
court recognized that it would indeed be incongruous to attribute
such an intent to Congress to mandate resort to state proceedings
when those same proceedings would be terminated by the initiation of a federal suit under the ADEA. The Congressional Conference Report issued in conjunction with the 1978 Amendments indicates an even stronger disapproval for the state relief first proposition:
It is the committee's view that an individual who has been
discriminated against because of age is free to proceed either
under State law or under federal law. The choice is up to the
individual. However, as Section 14(b) makes clear if the individual does choose to proceed initially under State law, he must
give the State agency at least 60 days to take remedial action
before he may commence a federal action.7

Finally, Holliday sets forth the most logical basis for not adhering
to a requirement of state relief first. The court states that any such
15584 F.2d 1221 (3rd Cir. 1978).
78 See, Note, The Age Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967, 90 HAav. L.
REv. 380, 411 (1976); Note, State Deferralof Complaints Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 462 (1976); Note, Procedural
Prerequisitesto Private Suit Under the Age Discriminationin Employment Act,
44 U. CHi L. REv. 457, 475.80 (1977).
434 U.S. 575 (1978).
7'Id. at 584-85.
71 S.

REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 119781 U. S. CODE

CONG. & AD. NEws 976, 982.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol81/iss3/10

16

McDonald: Age Discrimination in Employment Suits: A Practical Guide

AGE DISCRIMINATION SUITS
requirement would not serve to effectuate but would instead frustrate the purposes of the ADEA:
[I]t seems anomolous to us that deference must be accorded
to state agency procedures when it is a federal right that is
sought to be vindicated . . . -The ADEA's purposes would
be frustrated rather than fulfilled if we were to perpetuate a
procedural requirement which in many instances would prevent
an otherwise meritorious age discrimination claim from being
considered.80
It may be safely said that adequate justifications now exist
which may be relied upon by the ADEA plaintiff and attorney in
support of his choice of forums. However, it should be kept in mind
that despite the opinion in Holliday, it is not inconceivable that
other federal courts will adhere to the Goger line of "state relief
first" decisions. Therefore caution should be exercised before filing
a federal claim without seeking prior state relief.
VI.

AVAILABLE REMEDIES IN AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES
A.

Under the ADEA

The federal courts continue their divergent interpretations of
the ADEA in applying the remedies available under the act. While
the recovery of attorney's fees in ADEA actions is well settled,,"
there is no such agreement on whether the ADEA allows for the
recovery of either punitive damages or damages for pain and suffering. Punitive damages have been allowed by some courts on the
theory that such an allowance is needed to act as a deterrent to
any further violations by discriminating employers.2 Other courts,
however, hold that punitive damages are not recoverable because
of the absence in the language of the ADEA of any mention of
punitive damages." It can at least be argued that if the recovery
" 584 F.2d at 1230.
81See Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433
F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977) (discussing the factors to be considered in determining the amount of attorney's fees).
82 See Kennedy v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 449 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Col.
1978); Walker v. Pettit Construction Co., 437 F. Supp. 730 (D.S.C. 1977); Bertrand
v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Combes v. Griffin
Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
" See Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 570 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1978);
Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1066 (1978); Quinn v. Bowmar Publishing Co., 445 F. Supp. 780 (D. Md. 1978).
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of punitive damages had been intended, Congress would have specifically stated so as it did when it sanctioned the recovery of
punitive damages in Title VIII actions under the 1968 Civil Rights
Act."
The federal courts are similarly divided regarding the recovery
of damages for pain and suffering. Those jurisdictions which have
found such damages nonrecoverable have based their rationale on
the absence of any language in the ADEA providing for recovery
of damages for pain and suffering. It has been argued that the
ADEA requires the use of administrative remedies first and that
if Congress had intended to grant the administrative agency the
power to award such damages, it would have specifically provided
for this power." Additionally it is argued that to grant such power
to the Secretary of Labor would serve no purpose but would impair
his conciliatory function by requiring him to become an arbitrator
in money suits."6
A combination of the above justifications for the nonrecovery
of damages for pain and suffering is found in the 1979 Fourth
Circuit case of Slatin v. Stanford Research Institute." Upon review
of the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiffs request for pain
and suffering damages, Slatin extensively discussed, and found
itself in agreement with, the only three circuit court decisions on
this issue. 8 The justification offered by the court in Slatin for the
disallowance of pain and suffering damages in ADEA suits may
best be summarized as follows:
(1) The Congressional intent as reflected by legislative his42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1968).

See Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., 550
F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978). But see Note, Age
Discrimination-CompensatoryDamages for Painand Suffering Held Recoverable
Under the Age Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967, 7 SaroN HALL L. REv.
642 (1976).
81 See Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co.,
550 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
No. 77-1223 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 1979).
" Vasquez v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1978); Dean v.
American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1066 (1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
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9
tory"
and judicial expression"0 clearly indicates that the ADEA
is to be enforced through the procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
(2) By reference to Vasquez v. Eastern Airlines," one is reminded that those decisions construing the FLSA have specifically limited any recovery under that Act to those damages
enumerated therein.
(3) The only damages specifically recoverable under the
ADEA 1 or the pertinent provision of the FLSA"1 are "unpaid
minimum wages," "unpaid overtime compensation," and
"liquidated damages.".
(4) It is reasonable to assume that Congress was aware of the
limited recovery allowed under the FLSA and therefore acquiesced in applying such a limited recovery to ADEA suits.

The Fourth Circuit also rendered the view that the allowance
of pain and suffering damages would have the effect of impairing
the Secretary's conciliatory duties. Quoting from Dean v. American Security Ins. Co.,' 4 the court stated:
The silence of the Act with respect to general damages is
entirely consistent with legislative intent to abstain from introducing a violative ingredient into the tripartite negotiations
involving Secretary, employee and employer which might well
be calculated to frustrate rather than to "effectuate the purposes" of the Act. 5
On the other hand, a compelling discussion in favor of the
recoverability of damages for pain and suffering is found in the
1977 decision in Coates v. National Cash Register Company." Although it concerned all phases of recoverable ADEA damages, 7
" Testimony by Senator Javits before Labor Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 133 CONG. REc. 7076, (1967), cited in Statin,
No. 77-1223, slip op. at 7.
" Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
" 579 F.2d at 109-110.
,2 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
" 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976).
, 559 F.2d at 1038-39.
" No. 77-1223, slip op. at 10.
" 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977).
"The court summarized the measure of back pay damages to be
the difference between the salary an employee would have received but
for the violation of the Act and the salary actually received from other
employment.. . . The back pay amount [is] reduced by severance pay
received, unemployment compensation collected, and any amounts earnable with reasonable diligence. Finally, the back pay amount should be
increased by the value of any pension benefits, health insurance, seniority, leavetime, or other fringe benefits which the employee would have
accrued during the back pay period but for the violation of the Act.
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Coates cites the following reasons for allowing the recovery of damages for pain and suffering:
(1) the ADEA, like Title VI.I of the Civil Rights Act of 1968
(42 U.S.C. § 3612) creates a new statutory tort, and the existence of such a statutory right implies the existence of necessary
and appropriate remedies;
(2) the ADEA shares the 'make whole' purpose of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the emotional and psychological losses occasioned by age discrimination were clearly recognized by the Congress in its deliberations on the Act;
(3) compensatory awards for pain and suffering have been
found appropriate in other discrimination contexts, including
employment and housing;
(4) the cases denying damage awards for pain and suffering in
Title VII actions have been premised on that statute's express
limitation of relief to equitable remedies, whereas the ADEA
contains a specific allowance of legal relief."
B.

Under the West Virginia Human Rights Act

"If our society and government seriously desire to stamp out
the evil of unlawful discrimination which is symptomatic of unbridled bigotry, and we believe they do, then it is imperative that the
duty of enforcement be accompanied by an effective and meaningful means of enforcement.""9 The West Virginia supreme court
thus indicated the importance of providing the State Human
Rights Commission with the remedial force necessary to effectively
perform its functions. Although the West Virginia supreme court
has not yet decided an age discrimination case under the West
Virginia statute, its decisions dealing with other forms of discrimination define the powers granted to the Human Rights Commission regardless of the type of discrimination case it is considering.
In 1975, in State Human Rights Commission v. Pauley, the
West Virginia supreme court considered whether the Human
Rights Commission held the power to grant monetary awards to
aggrieved parties. The commission had awarded $480 for compensatory damages, $100 for pain and suffering, and $100 in exemplary
Id. at 663. See also, Bucholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Wis. 1978)
(holding that back pay may include the loss of the plaintiff's earnings from commission sales where the commission earnings can reasonably be determined by looking
at the plaintiff's past record).
433 F. Supp. at 664.
" State Human Rights Comm'n v. Pauley, 212 S. E. 2d 77, 79 (W. Va. 1975).
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damages. The court held that although the Human Rights Act
impliedly confers the power to grant monetary awards, it only
confers such powers as are reasonably and necessarily required to
accomplish the purposes of the act.1o Thus the court upheld the
award of compensatory damages for out-of-pocket expenses, but
rejected both the award of damages for pain and suffering and the
award of exemplary damages.''
In the 1977 decision of State Human Rights Commission v.
PearlmanRealty Agency, the court reconsidered the issues raised
in Pauley and expanded the extent to which the commission could
compensate those who have been subjected to unlawful discrimination.0 2 Overruling Pauley's refusal to allow damages for pain
and suffering, Pearlman held that damages are recoverable for
humiliation, embarrassment, emotional and mental distress, and
loss of personal dignity resulting from the unlawful discrimination.' 3 The court, however, intimated that there existed a ceiling
upon the granting of such awards when it indicated that money
damages of this nature are recoverable only when incidental to the
commission's broad powers of enforcement.' 4
The court in Pearlmantook an additional step in the furtherance of the public's right to be free from discrimination. The court
stated that in those cases where the amount of monetary damages
would exceed the commission's jurisdiction, discrimination victims may instead have access to the courts.' 5 The court based its
position upon a reading of West Virginia Code section 5-11-9,
which sets out those unlawful discriminatory practices, and West
Virginia Constitution article 3, section 17, which provides that the
courts shall be open to all those who have been injured.
A combined view of Pauley and PearImanwould indicate that
the West Virginia supreme court will look upon any discriminatory
practices with grave displeasure and will attempt to piovide West
Virginia citizens with the fullest protection possible. The Human
Rights Commission is now empowered to grant compensatory
damages, and, within limits, damages for pain and suffering. Finally, in those instances where the monetary award that is sought
'" Id. at 80.

Id.
,o 239 S.E.2d 145 (W. Va. 1977).
"°
"'

I

Id. at 146.
Id. at 148.

Id.
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would be beyond the commission's power, aggrieved parties will
have the right to a private remedy through the state court system.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Age discrimination is one of the least understood areas of civil
rights. The ADEA is a confusing and complex statute which has
lent itself to divergent court interpretation on almost every aspect
of its coverage. We should not allow this difficulty to act as a
barricade to progress in protecting the rights of the elderly. Hopefully this article will provide a practical tool which may be used
to further these important societal goals.
J. Michael McDonald
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